We continue the study of the effects of selfish behavior in the network design problem. We provide new bounds for the price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation for undirected graphs. We consider the most general case, for which the best known upper bound is the Harmonic number H n , where n is the number of agents, and the best previously known lower bound is 12/7 ≈ 1.778.
Introduction
The effects of selfish behavior in networks is a natural problem with long-standing and wide-spread practical relevance. As such, a wide variety of network design and connection games have received attention in the algorithmic game theory literature (for a survey, see [TW07] ).
One natural question is how much the users' selfish behavior affects the performance of the system. Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [KP99, Pap01] addressed this question using a worst-case measure, namely the Price of Anarchy (PoA). This notion compares the cost of the worst-case Nash equilibrium to that of the social optimum (the best that could be obtained by central coordination). From an optimistic point of view, Anshelevich et al. [ADK + 04] proposed the Price of Stability (PoS), the ratio of the lowest Nash equilibrium cost to the social cost, as a measure of the minimal effect of selfishness.
There has been substantial work on the PoA for congestion games, a broad class of games with interesting properties originally introduced by Rosenthal [Ros73] . Congestion games nicely model situations that arise in selfish routing, resource allocation and network design problems, and PoA for these games is now quite wellunderstood [RT02, CK05b, CK05a, AAE05] . By comparison, much less work has been done on the PoS: The PoS for network design games has been studied by [ADK + 04, CR06, Alb08, FKL + 06, Li08], while the PoS for routing games 1 was studied by [ADK + 04, CK05a, CFK + 06]. However, PoA techniques cannot easily be transferred to study of the PoS. New techniques thus need to be developed; this work moves toward this direction.
The particular network design problem we address here is the one which was initially studied by Anshelevich et al. [ADK + 04], sometimes referred to as the fair cost sharing network design (or creation) game. In it, each player has a set of endpoints in a network that he must connect; to achieve this, he must choose a subset of the links in the network to utilize. Each link has a cost associated with it, and if more than one player wishes to utilize the same link, the cost of that link is split evenly among the players. Each player's goal is to pay as little as possible to connect her endpoints. The global social objective is to connect all player's endpoints as cheaply as possible.
Anshelevich et al. [ADK + 04] showed that if G is a directed graph, the price of anarchy is equal to n, the number of players, whereas the price of stability is exactly the nth harmonic number H n . The upper bound is proven by using the fact that our network design game, and in fact any congestion game, is a potential game. A potential game, first defined by Monderer and Shapley [MS96] , is a game where the change to a player's payoff due to a deviation from a game solution can be reflected in a potential function, or a function that maps game states to real numbers. The potential function for this game is
where X is an outcome or strategy profile of the game, and n e is the number of players on edge e in X.
This upper bound of H n holds even in the case of undirected graphs (since the potential function of the game does not change when the underlying graph is undirected), however the lower bound does not. Hence the central open question we study is:
What is the price of stability in the fair cost sharing network design game on undirected graphs?
In the case of two players and a single common sink vertex, Anshelevich et al. [ADK + 04] show that the answer is 4/3. Some further progress has also more recently been made toward answering this question. Fiat et al. [FKL + 06] showed that in the case where there is a single common sink vertex and every other vertex is a source vertex, the price of stability is O(log log n). They also give an n-player lower bound instance of 12/7. For the more general case where the agents share a sink but not every vertex is a source vertex, Li [Li08] showed an upper bound of O(log n/ log log n). Chen and Roughgarden [CR06] studied the price of stability for the weighted variant of the game, where each player pays a fraction of each edge cost proportional to her weight. Albers [Alb08] showed that in this variant, the price of stability is Ω(log W/ log log W ), where W is the sum of the players' weights.
Our contributions We show for the first time that the price of stability in undirected networks is definitively different from the one for directed networks in the general case (where all players may have distinct source and destination vertices). In particular, we show that PoS is exactly 4/3 for two agents (strictly less than PoS in the directed case, which is H 2 = 3/2), while for three agents it is at least 74/48 ≈ 1.542 and at most 1.65 (again strictly less than PoS in the directed case, which is H 3 = 11/6). Furthermore, we show that the price of stability for general n is at least 42/23 > 1.8261, improving upon the previous bound due to Fiat et al. [FKL + 06].
The model
We are given an underlying network, G = (V, E), where V is the set of vertices and E is the set of edges in the network. Each player i = 1 . . . n has a set of two nodes (endpoints) s i , t i ∈ V to connect. We refer to s i as the source endpoint of player i and t i as the destination or sink endpoint of player i. The strategy set of each player i consists of all sets of edges S i ⊆ E such that S i connects all the vertices in T i . There is a cost c e associated with each edge e ∈ E. The cost to player i of a solution Figure 2.1: On the left are two levels in our construction. The situation on the right is not a Nash equilibrium because of the added ε's on the horizontal edges. The numbers in the right figure give the costs for each agent that uses these edges.
where n e is the number of players in S who chose a strategy that contains e. Each player i has payoff function
2 A Lower Bound of 1.826
Consider a 3 by N grid for some large N . There are three nodes and two horizontal edges in every row. The levels are numbered starting from the bottom. We denote the horizontal edges on level i by L i and R i (from left to right). The nodes on level i are denoted by v ij (j = 1, 2, 3) and the vertical edges connecting level i to level i + 1 are denoted by e ij (j = 1, 2, 3). Each node v ij for i = 1, . . . , N − 1 and j = 1, 2, 3 is the source of some agent p i,j , who has node v i+1,j as its sink. We say that player p i,j starts at level i. Also we will call player p i,j the owner of edge e i,j , with p i,j owning only edge e i,j (one of the possible paths for a player to reach its sink is to use just the edge it owns).
Horizontal edges cost 6 + ε and 5 + ε, vertical edges cost 12, 15, and 15 (from left to right), where ε is a small positive number. We do not refer to ε in the calculations, but simply state when relevant that the costs of horizontal edges are "more than" 6 and 5, respectively. One motivation for choosing the numbers as we do is shown in Figure 2 .1, right.
Proof outline It is possible to connect the sources and sinks of all the players by using all the horizontal edges and only the vertical edges on the left. For large N and small ε, the cost of this tends to 23 per level.
Our goal is to show that in a Nash equilibrium, all players use the direct link between their source and their sink. Let us assume that some players deviate from this. We start by considering a level i which is not visited by any agents with higher sources, and also not by agents that have lower sinks. In Lemma 2.7, we show that any agent that reaches such a level moves immediately to its sink. We prove in Lemma 2.9 that as long as no agent uses any edge below its source vertex, all agents move straight to their sinks. Section 2.3 is devoted to showing that it is indeed the case that no player moves below its source vertex. To do so, we first bound the number of players that can reach a given level from below in Lemmas 2.12-2.16. We find that there can be at most two such agents. This in turn helps us to show in Lemmas 2.18-2.20 that players that move below their sources would have to pay too much for their paths, thus showing that no agent moves below their starting levels. This immediately gives us our result, which is summarized in Theorem 2.21.
Observation 2.1. In a Nash equilibrium, all player paths are acyclic, and the graph that is formed by the paths of any pair of players is acyclic as well.
Thus, whenever we find a cycle of one of these types, we know that this is not a Nash equilibrium. Players on the left We begin by making sure that players on the left always use the edge they own (the direct link between their source and sink). To do so, for all levels i, we substitute e i,1 by a path of three edgeŝ e i,1 ,ê i,2 ,ê i,3 each of which has cost 4 (and thus the path of the three edges together has cost 12). Player p i,1 is also substituted by three playersp i,j (j = 1, 2, 3), withp ij having as source and sink the lower and upper endpoints of edgeê i,j , respectively. (Playerp i,1 has node v i,1 as its source and playerp i,3 has node v i+1,1 as its sink.) One can now see that the playersp i,j (j = 1, 2, 3) will never deviate from their own edges; each such player would have to share two edges of cost 4 with only their owners, since its sink and/or its source would be terminals. Given that these players will never deviate, we will treat them as one player p i,1 , and the patĥ e i,1 ,ê i,2 ,ê i,3 as the single edge e i,1 , with p i,1 using edge e i,1 in any Nash Equilibrium. This means that the cost for e i,1 is 4 in this case. However, in this case, the edge that p uses to come back down to level i costs 7.5. We conclude that if p pays 6 for e i,1 , its total cost is at least 6 + 6 + 5 > 15, and otherwise, its total cost is at least 6 + 4 + 7.5 > 15. In both cases, this implies that this is not a Nash equilibrium.
Separators

Lemma 2.9. Consider a Nash equilibrium in which no agent uses any edge below its source. Then all agents move straight to their sinks.
Proof. We twice use induction. We first show that all players on the right move straight to their sinks, while players in the middle either move straight to their sink or move left, up, and immediately right. Using this, we then show that all players in the middle move straight to their sink. Consider first level 1. By the assumption of this Lemma, level 2 is a separator. If player p 1,3 uses L 1 , player p 1,2 must do this as well by Lemma 2.8. In addition, in this case p 1,3 uses R 1 as well, but p 1,2 does not, and neither does any other player. Both p 1,3 and p 1,2 then use edge e 1,1 , and then p 1,3 continues via edge L 2 and R 2 by Lemma 2.7, Case 2. This fixes its entire path. We can now calculate the cost for this path depending on the first edge on the path of p 2,2 .
If this is L 2 , the cost is more than 5 + 3 + 4 + 1.5 + 2.5 = 16 (p 2,2 is not on R 2 in this case, and neither is p 1,2 ). If the first (and only) edge is e 2,2 , the cost is more than 5 + 3 + 4 + 2 + 2.5 = 19. If the first edge is R 2 , the cost is more than 5 + 3 + 4 + 3 + 2.5 = 17.5 (p 2,3 is not on R 2 in this case, because p 2,2 uses e 2,3 , Observation 2.2). In all cases, this is too much.
This shows that p 1,3 does not use edge L 1 . Suppose that p 1,3 uses R 1 . It then uses e 1,2 together with p 1,2 (Observation 2.2). Since R 2 is used by at most one of the players p 2,2 and p 2,3 (by Observation 2.1 and because no agents move down below their source), p 1,3 pays more than 5 + 15/2 + 5/2 = 15, a contradiction. The exact same calculation shows that p 1,2 does not use R 1 .
The only case left open is the one where p 1,2 uses L 1 , but p 1,3 does not. However, in this case, due to Lemma 2.7, Case 1, it also uses L 2 to reach its sink, making level 3 a separator, because level 3 is not visited by p 1,2 or p 1,3 . Note that if p 1,2 does move directly to its sink from its source, then level 3 is a separator too.
We can now continue the proof by induction. Consider a level i and assume that all lower players on the right move straight to their source, where lower players in the middle might deviate and use the left edge. Also by induction, assume that level i + 1 is a separator, so that we can use the same lemmas as in the base case. Compared to the calculations above for the case where p 1,3 uses L 1 , the only change is that edge L i might cost only 2 + ε/3 instead of 3 + ε/2, since at most one additional agent (p i−1,2 ) may be using it. This still gives a total cost of more than 15 in all cases, completing the first part of the proof.
We can now prove, also using induction, that agents in the middle move straight to their source. If p 1,2 uses L 1 , it pays more than 6 + 6 + 3 = 15 since L 1 now costs more than 3, so it does not do that. By induction, if no player below level i deviates, we find the same calculation for any middle player that moves left. This completes the proof. We will derive bounds for the number of agents that can be in S . The following useful lemma is proved in the appendix.
Lemma 2.12. Let i be a level with a source of an agent in S that is not the lowest such level.
There is only one agent in S with a source on level i.
Any player that uses an edge e i,j and does not own it is in S .
Corollary 2.13. Let i be a level with an agent in S that is not the lowest such level. Each edge e i−1,j is used only by its owner and by agents in S (if it is used at all).
Lemma 2.14. We have |S | ≤ 3. If the lowest level which contains a source of an agent in S only contains one such source, we have |S | ≤ 2.
Proof. Let i be the lowest level with a source from a player in S . Assume first there is only one player p ∈ S who starts on level i. Denote by E p the set of levels in the path of p that contain other sources of players in S . Player p must traverse two edges e k,j for each k ∈ E p , and by Lemma 2.12, only players in S traverse them. The cost of p for these edges is then at least (12 + 15)(
Suppose level i has two players from S , say p and p , and |S | > 3 (and hence i < − 1). These agents must use the left edges e i,1 and e i+1,1 to move up, else at least one of them travels no further than its sink and in particular, does not use a horizontal edge above level i + 1. The edges L i+1 , e i,2 and e i,3 are not used by any player, so the edges e i,1 and e i+1,1 are only used by p, p , and the owners, at a cost of 8. In particular, e i,1 costs at least 4.
Their total cost is then more than 4 + (12 + 15)( Proof. A horizontal edge can be used by at most three agents from that level or below by Lemma 2.14 and at most three agents from that level or above by symmetry. A vertical edge e is used by its owner; other players moving on e must use a horizontal edge both before and afterwards, thus there are at most three such players going up and three going down by Lemma 2.14 (and its symmetric version).
Lemma 2.16. We have |S | ≤ 2.
Proof. Again, let i be the number of the lowest level with agents in S . Assume |S | = 3 and hence i < − 1. As in the proof of Lemma 2.14, we see that p and p have a total cost of at least 4 + 27/4 = 10.75 for vertical edges. For horizontal edges, the leftmost player (say p Proof. The proof is completely analogous to the proof of Corollary 2.15.
Agents do not move down
Due to Lemma 2.9, all we need to show is that no player moves below its starting level in a Nash equilibrium. Consider the topmost level i such that there is a player A, with source at level i, that moves below i. Denote the other player that has its source on level i and that does not start on the left by A . (Note that the player with source v i,1 never deviates). A must visit levels below i before it reaches level i + 1. Otherwise, either i reaches its sink before going down to i − 1, or it will have to form a cycle within its path to go back up to i + 1. Similarly, since A goes both below and above level i, it cannot use both L i and R i . In the following, we will be repeatedly making use of Lemma 2.16 and Corollary 2.17, and the fact that no player with source above level i ever visits a level i ≤ i (by definition of A, A ).
Lemma 2.18. A does not move first horizontally and then down.
Proof. Assume that A uses first one of the horizontal edges of level i and then immediately goes down. Since A has to go back up to level i, it creates a path connecting all three nodes of level i using only edges incident to nodes of levels j ≤ i. This implies that there is no player p with source at level i − 1 or below, that visits level i + 1. To see this, note that after reaching i + 1, p would eventually have to go back down to level i, thus creating another path connecting two nodes of i, this time containing only edges incident to nodes in levels j ≥ i (with at least one vertical edge incident to a node of level i + 1). Therefore, the paths of A and p would form a cycle. By definition of A, there is also no player with source above level i that visits level i.
Let c 1 be the column that A starts from, c 2 = c 1 the column it reaches after using the first horizontal edge, and c 3 the remaining column of the grid. Note that since A uses a horizontal edge of level i, one of c 1 , c 2 must be the middle column. A cannot create a cycle going from its source back to level i, therefore it must use edge e = e i−1,c 3 . Moreover, edge (v i,c 3 , v i,2 ) is not used by any player, otherwise a cycle with A's path would be formed. Therefore, any player on e that does not own it (including A), must also use e = e i,c 3 . Given that no player with source below i visits level i + 1, and no player with source above i visits level i − 1, the edges e , e can only by used by the owners and A, A . Therefore, A pays at least 2 · 12 3 = 8 for them. Consider now the first edge that A uses to reach level i − 1. By Corollary 2.17 there are at most 5 players using it, and thus A pays at least Proof. Assume that A goes straight down from its source. We denote by e that first edge down (i.e., e = e i−1,3 ). Let e be the edge that A uses to reach level i again, after going down. By Lemma 2.18 and Lemma 2.19, A does not move down which means that A does not use e, e . Any other player using them, apart from A and the owners, will belong to S i (remember that no player with source above i visits a level below i + 1). Therefore A shares e, e with at most 3 more players (the owners and two more players that will belong to S i ). Let e be the edge A uses to reach level i+1 from i. Any player on e (apart from the owner) will belong to S i+1 together with A. Again, since |S i+1 | ≤ 2, A shares e with at most two more players (the owner and one more player that will belong to S i+1 ). If any of e , e is in the left column, then the path of A must cross from the right side of the grid to the left and back, implying a total cost of at least 15/4 (for e) +12/4 (for e ) +12/3 (for e ) +2 · 6+5 4 > 15. If, on the other hand, none of e , e are in the left column, then the total cost of A is more than 15/4 (for e) +15/4 (for e ) +15/3 (for e ) +2 · 5/4 = 15. Proof. Due to Lemma 2.18, Lemma 2.19 and Lemma 2.20, no agents move down below their source. Therefore, by Lemma 2.9, all agents move straight to their sink in the (unique) Nash equilibrium. On every level, the total cost of the agents in the Nash equilibrium is 12 + 15 + 15 = 42, whereas the optimal cost is only 12 + 6 + 5 = 23. The optimal solution has an additional cost of 11 for the two horizontal edges on level 1, but this cost is negligible for large N .
Two Players
Anshelevich et al [ADK + 04] gave a two player lower bound instance for our problem showing price of stability is at least 4/3. They then show that if both players share a sink, the price of stability is at most 4/3. In this section, we show an unconditional two-player upper bound on the price of stability of 4/3. The proof is in the appendix.
Theorem 3.1. In the fair cost sharing network design game with two players, price of stability is at most 4/3.
Three players
Lower bound Figure 4 .2 shows a three player instance where the best Nash equilibrium has cost 37/24 times that of OPT. Node s i , t i is the source, destination, respectively of player i, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The optimal solution would only use the edges (s 1 , s 2 ), (s 2 , s 3 ), (s 3 , t 1 ), (t 1 , t 2 ), while the Nash solution uses the direct edges (s 1 , t 1 ), (s 2 , t 2 ), (s 3 , t 3 ). The cost of the optimal solution sums then up to 48 + 4 , while the Nash Equilibrium solution has cost 74. We have therefore the following theorem. 2 > 26, so it would rather use the direct edge (s 3 , t 2 ) instead. Therefore p 3 is either on (s 3 , t 2 ), or (s 3 , t 1 ) and (t 1 , t 2 ). As a result, the cost of p 2 is at least 8 + + Therefore also p 2 uses the direct edge (s 2 , t 2 ). Now player p 3 would not use edge (s 2 , t 2 ) since it would require a total cost of at least 14 + + 24 2 > 26. It cannot then reach node s 2 as this would create a cycle with p 2 . If it uses (s 1 , s 3 ) it must also use (s 1 , t 1 ), and pay at least 15 + + 24 2 + 8 > 26. Edge (s 3 , t 2 ) results in a lower cost than using both (s 3 , t 1 ) and (t 1 , t 2 ), and thus p 3 also using the direct edge (s 3 , t 2 ).
The above imply that the Nash Equilibrium is unique.
Upper bound Given an instance of our problem, let OPT refer to an optimal solution. We refer to the union of the players' paths at OPT as the OPT graph. Recall that the potential function for our game is Φ(X) = e∈E c e H(X e ) where c e is the cost of edge e, H(x) is the xth harmonic number, X is a game state or solution, and X e is the number of players on edge e in X. Let N be a potential minimizing Nash solution (or, alternatively, N can be defined as a Nash solution reached by starting from OPT and making alternating best-response moves). Hence, we have
We now give names for various sets of edges, each of which may or may not be empty. Let A, B, and C be the sets of edges that player 1, player 2, and player 3 (respectively) use alone in N . Let S ij for i = 1 . . . 2 and j = i + 1 . . . 3 be the set of edges that players i and j alone share in N . Let S 123 be the set of edges that all three players share in N . Let A * , B * , C * , S * 12 , S * 13 , S * 23 and S * 123 be defined analogously for OPT. We will also use the same names to refer to the total cost of the edges in each set.
Let C(X) refer to the cost of the solution X and let C i (X) refer to the cost just to player i of the solution X. By definition, we have
We proceed by case analysis. Next, we proceed to the case where S * 123 > 0. Lemma 4.3. In the fair cost sharing network design game with three players, if all three players share at least one edge of positive cost in the optimal solution, the price of stability is at most 33/20 = 1.65.
Proof. First observe that the edges in the set S * 123 must form a contiguous path, that is, once the three players' paths in the OPT graph merge, as soon as one player's path breaks off, the three may never merge again. (Otherwise the OPT graph would have a cycle, contradicting the fact that it is an optimal solution.) Without loss of generality, we can exchange the labels on the endpoint vertices so that the three endpoints on the same side of the edges in S * 123 are all source endpoints, and the three endpoints on the other side are all destination endpoints. Then observe that at least one of S * 12 , S * 23 , and S * 13 must be empty. Otherwise the OPT graph would have a cycle, contradicting the definition of OPT. Without loss of generality, we assume that S * 13 is empty, hence S * 13 = 0 and C(OP T ) = A * + B * + C * + S * 12 + S * 23 + S * 123 . We know by definition of N that each player i pays not more at N than by unilaterally defecting to any alternate s i − t i connection path. The right hand sides of each of the following inequalities represents an upper bound on the cost of a feasible alternate s i − t i path for each player i. The existence of these alternate paths depends on the assumption that the OPT graph is connected and S * 13 = 0.
To interpret the above inequalities intuitively, consider for example the first inequality. It states the fact that player 1 pays an amount at Nash that is at most the cost of unilaterally deviating and instead taking the path in the OPT graph from s 1 to s 2 where player 2's OPT path begins (possibly using edges from A * , B * , and S * 23 ), then following along player 2's path in N from s 2 to t 2 (using edges from B, S 12 , S 23 , and S 123 ), then taking edges in the OPT graph from t 2 to t 1 (again possibly using edges from A * , B * , and S * 23 ). The costs of S * 12 and S * 123 need not be included in the right-hand side of the first inequality for the following reasoning. Recall that by assumption, source vertices are on one side of the edges in S * 123 and sink vertices are on the other side of the edges in S * 123 , so traversing any edges in S * 123 is not necessary for player 1 to go from s 1 to s 2 or from t 2 to t 1 in the OPT graph. Also note that the edges in S * 12 must be adjacent to the contiguous path formed by edges in S *
123
(since otherwise, the OPT graph would contain a cycle), and so in fact, s 1 and s 2 are on one side of S * 12 ∪ S * 123 , while t 1 and t 2 are on the other. From inequality (4.1) and the assumption that S * 13 = 0, we can say We are now ready to present our main theorem of this section.
Theorem 4.4. In the fair cost sharing network design game with three players, the price of stability is at most 33/20 = 1.65.
Proof. All possible OPT graph structures are handled by Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3. The worst upper bound for price of stability over these two exhaustive cases is that given by Lemma 4.3.
Conclusions
The lower bound instance that we use for large n could be generalized by adding more columns. However, it seems that this would require a significantly longer and more involved proof. More importantly, we believe that even with an unbounded number of columns we could only show a lower bound of a small constant. Hence, the question of whether the price of stability grows with n remains open. We conjecture that it is in fact constant.
[MS96] 
A Two Players
Given an instance of the problem, let OPT refer to any optimal solution for that instance. Then we define A * , B * , and S * to be sets of edges in OPT as follows. A * is the set of edges that player 1 buys alone in OPT. B * is the set of edges player 2 buys alone in OPT. And S * is the set of edges players 1 and 2 share in OPT. We define the OPT graph to be A * ∪ B * ∪ S * , or the union of the players paths at OPT. First, observe that if the OPT graph is disconnected, price of stability is 1. (If not, then OPT is not a Nash equilibrium. Which means a player can unilaterally defect and pay less than she does at OPT. But then, since by assumption no players share any edges at OPT, the new state reached after this defection would cost less than OPT, contradicting the definition of OPT.) Hence, we can assume the OPT graph is connected, i.e., that the players paths cross. Second, we observe that after the players paths join, they cannot separate, then rejoin. This is simply because there cannot be any cycles in the OPT graph as it would contradict the fact that OPT is an optimal solution.
Without loss of generality we can relabel the endpoints so that both source endpoints are on the same side of the edges in S * and both destination endpoints are on the other side. We refer to the point in OPT where the two players' paths first join as the merge point and the successive point where they separate, if such a point exists, as the departure point. Note that the merge point and the departure point may be the same point in the graph.
Recall potential function Φ(P ) = e∈E c e H ne where c e is the cost of edge e and n e is the number of players on edge e in strategy profile P . Let N be the nash that minimizes the potential function. Let S be the set of shared edges at N . Let A be the set of edges that are only bought by player 1 at N . Let B be the set of edges that are only bought by player 2 at N . We will also use the same variables to refer to the total cost of the edges in each set. Hence if C(X) refers to the cost of the solution X and C i (X) refers to the cost just to player i of the solution X, then we have C(N ) = A + B + S, C 1 (N ) = A + S/2 and C 2 (N ) = B + S/2.
Since Φ(N ) ≤ Φ(OP T ) (by definition of N ) we have
Also, since N is a nash, we have A+S/2 ≤ (cost to player 1 of defecting to any alternate path from s 1 to t 1 ). In particular, if we let P refer to the path from s 1 to the merge point in OPT, continuing in OPT onto s 2 , next continuing along player 2's path in N from s 2 to t 2 , then continuing along player 2's path in OPT from t 2 back to the departure point in OPT, and finally following player 1's path from the departure point to t 1 , then we know that A + S/2 ≤ (cost to player 1 of defecting to If edge L i is used, but R i is not used, then p uses edge e i,1 or e i,2 at cost at least 4 (it is only shared with the owner and possibly p i,2 ), and edge e i,3 at cost at least 7.5 (only shared with the owner-note that v i,3 is a terminal in this case), for a total cost of at least 11.5 to get from v i,1 to v i,3 . But it could travel via R i and L i and pay only at most 3 + 5 = 8, a contradiction.
We still need to lower bound the cost of edges L i and R i . On these edges, only p, p , p i,2 and p i,3 can travel. Moreover, p i,2 can only travel on one of them, since otherwise it has a cycle in its path. Finally, if p i,2 uses R i , it also uses e i,3 , since e i−1,3 is not in use. So in this case, p i,3 travels straight to its goal. Thus, the cost to p of using L i and R i is at least 3/2 + 5/2 (p i,2 uses L i ), 2 + 5/2 (p i,2 uses R i ), or 3 + 5/2 (p i,2 uses e i,2 ). This is at least 4 in all cases, which is what we wanted to show.
3. Finally, if p uses e i−1,2 , it shares that edge only with p, and p stops at v i,2 . If p moves further up (possibly after first moving to the left), it shares its final downward edge e i,3 also only with its owner (because v i,3 is a terminal, which follows since edges R i and e i,3 are not in use in this case), so p already pays 15/2 for edge e i,3 alone, a contradiction.
Proof. (Lemma 2.12) 1. Two of the edges {e i,j |j = 1, 2, 3} must be in use, since there exists a lower agent in S , which must go up and come down over different vertical edges. In particular, at least one of e i,2 and e i,3 is in use, and its owner is therefore not in S . Furthermore, no agent in S starts on the left. If the source of p is below level i, p must return to level i or below, using the unique other vertical edge among {e i,j |j = 1, 2, 3} that is in use. Player p can only use the same path as the nonempty set of players in S that come from below level i, since otherwise a bad cycle would be formed (two alternate paths connecting these two vertical edges). Hence p must visit level as well, and p ∈ S , a contradiction.
If the source of p is above level i, then its sink is above level i as well and it must return back up after dropping to level i. Thus, again, it must use the unique other vertical edge among {e i,j |j = 1, 2, 3} that is in use between level i and i + 1. But in that case, we again find a cycle if we combine the paths of p and any agent q ∈ S below level i (p forms a continuous path linking two nodes in level i from below, while q forms a continuous path linking those two nodes from above). So this case cannot occur, and we are done.
Proof. (Lemma 2.19)
Assume that A moves straight down along edge e = e i−1,2 . A uses a side of the grid to move back up to level i, say column c, and let e = e i−1,c be the corresponding edge. The horizontal edge v i2 v ic is not in use, otherwise there would be a cycle with A's path. Thus, any player on e that does not own it must also use e = e i,c and belong to S i+1 together with A. Since |S i+1 | ≤ 2, there can be at most one such player and there are at most three users in total on e , e .
Consider player A . By Lemma 2.18, A does not use R i followed by e. Edges v i2 v ic , e i,2 are not used by any player, which means that the only ways that A has to reach level i + 1 is to either move directly to its sink (using edge e i,3 ), or first move straight down from its source and eventually follow A through e , e . In the latter case, column c must be the leftmost column of the grid. A pays 2 · 12 3 = 8 for using e , e . Its first edge down costs least 15/5 = 3 (by Corollary 2.17), and A has to pay in total at least 2 · 6+5 4 > 5 for horizontal edges (as it has to move from the right side to the left and back). This sums up to more than 15, implying that A would use its own edge e i,3 instead.
Consider again the edges e , e that A uses to reach level i + 1. If the column of e , e is the rightmost column (the column of A ), then A would pay 2 · 15 3 = 10 for them. Edge e is used by at most 3 more players (the owner and two players in S i ), implying a cost of at least 15/4 > 3, while A would also have to use at least two horizontal edges, at a cost of at least 2 · 5 4 > 2, implying a total cost more than 15. Therefore e , e are on the leftmost side of the grid and are not used by A . If they are not used by any other player apart from A and the owners, then A would pay 2 ·
